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I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses Supreme Court of Florida decisions in the area of
substantive criminal law handed down between January 1, 1999 and May 1,
2000.1 Cases discussing substantive criminal procedure issues, e.g., search
and seizure, are not the subject of this survey, although they obviously are
important to the criminal law practitioner. As with past criminal law survey
articles, cases discussing the death penalty and sentencing guidelines are
omitted, as these are specialized areas beyond the scope of what actions (or
inactions) may constitute a crime. Cases from Florida's district courts of
appeal are mentioned in footnotes to the extent that their inclusion
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1. The authors have chosen as their beginning and ending points decisions reported in
volumes 723 through 760 of the Southern Second Reporter.
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supplements the textual discussion. Otherwise, Florida district court
decisions are not the subject of this article.
Even after cases involving the death penalty and sentencing are
eliminated, this survey does not discuss every Supreme Court of Florida
substantive criminal law decision. Those cases that merely address the
application of standard fact situations to a well-settled rule of law have also
been eliminated. Thus, this survey focuses on decisions which "broke
ground" in some way and thus contributed significantly to the dynamic
growth of Florida's substantive criminal law.
This survey is divided into two main parts. The first part discusses
Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning major or novel questions of
substantive criminal law that do not involve constitutional questions. The
second part discusses Supreme Court of Florida cases concerning
constitutional challenges to some of Florida's substantive criminal law
statutes.
II. BURGLARY
At common law, burglary was the breaking and entering of the dwelling
house of another during the nighttime in order to commit a felony therein.
Like other states' statutes, Florida's definition of burglary has significantly
broadened this definition.3 Section 810.02 of the Florida Statutes defines
"burglary" as "entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a
conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises
are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to
enter or remain.' 4 This definition expands the common law definition of
burglary to protect structures and conveyances as well as dwellings5 and
2. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510, 511 (Fla. 1982).
3. See id. at 512.
4. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (2000).
5. The burglary statute's definitions of "structure" (subsection 810.011(1)) and
"dwelling" (subsection 810.011(2)) also include the "curtilage" of these two places. See
§ 810.011(1)-(2). Both subsections specifically contain the language "together with the curtilage
thereof' in their definitions. Id. The term "curtilage" itself is not defined in the Florida Statutes.
Hamilton defined the term "curtilage" to require an enclosed area, not just any area connected
with a dwelling or structure. State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 1995). For a
detailed discussion of Hamilton, see Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1996 Survey of Florida
Law, 21 NOVA L. REv. 101, 117-22 (1996). The enclosure requirement also applies to Florida's
trespass statute. See FLA. STAT. § 810.08 (2000); L.K.B. v. State, 677 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
For a recent case discussing the meaning of "curtilage," see Mejias, where the court found
that a common parking area of an industrial park where several businesses were located within
two separate buildings could not be considered within the curtilage of one of the businesses even
[Vol. 25:1
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eliminates the requirement of a "breaking."' 6 The intruder also does not have
to intend to commit a felony; the intent to commit any offense inside the
protected area will do.7 Finally, the unlawful entry with criminal intent can
occur anytime, not just at night.8
The language in the second part of the definition of burglary in section
810.02 of the Florida Statutes has been labeled the "consent clause." 9 The
courts have construed the language "unless the premises are at the time open
to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain" as
constituting an affirmative defense to a burglary charge rather than an
element of the offense which the State must allege and subsequently
though the entire industrial park was enclosed. Mejias v. State, 731 So. 2d 728, 729 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Additionally, in Freeman, the court explained that an unenclosed area in
front of an abandoned apartment building was not within the "curtilage" for purposes of the
trespass in a structure statute. Freeman v. State, 743 So. 2d 603, 603 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.
1999).
For a recent case discussing what is a "structure" within the definition of section
810.011(1) of the Florida Statutes, see Bean, where the court found that an attached garage
within a wing of a house that shared a common roof and three walls with the rest of the building
was a structure under the burglary statute, even though it did not have a door. Bean v. State, 728
So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999).
If the structure that is burglarized or trespassed upon is "occupied," then a higher degree of
burglary or trespass is committed. Section 810.02(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes makes burglary of
an occupied structure a first-degree felony, and section 810.08(2)(b) makes trespass in an
occupied structure a first-degree misdemeanor. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(2)(c), .08(2)(b) (2000). In
D.E., the court recently found that when the only other persons in the place involved are the
defendant's confederates, that place is not occupied for purposes of the trespass statute. D.E. v.
State, 725 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1999). As chapter 810 does not define when a
place should be considered "occupied" and does not make a distinction between burglary and
trespass for purposes of this term, the same result should occur if the charge involved is a
burglary.
6. See State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510,511 (Fla. 1982).
7. Although intent to commit a felony is no longer required for a burglary offense, the
specific intent to commit a crime within the protected area is an essential element of burglary. Id.
at 512. Thus, ajury instruction that omits the requirement that the jury find an accused intended
to commit a crime after the unlawful entry constitutes reversible error even without an objection
at trial, as failure to adequately instruct the jury on an element of an offense is fundamental error.
Davis v. State, 736 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1999). However, it is not necessary to
instruct the jury on any specific crime that the accused purportedly intended to commit. Puskac
v. State, 735 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1999). The requirement that a jury be
instructed that it must find the defendant intended to commit an offense within a protected area
cannot be satisfied by instructing the jury that it must find the defendant intended to commit
"burglary." Viveros v. State, 699 So. 2d 822, 824-25 (Fla. 4th DisL CL App. 1997); Puskac, 735
So. 2d at 523.
8. Hicks, 421 So. 2d at 511.
9. Id.
2000]
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disprove. °  In actuality, this clause contains two separate affirmative
defenses. An accused can either claim that the entry into or remaining in
even a private protected area was with the legal occupant's explicit consent,
or allege that the entry was impliedly consensual by virtue of the premises
being open to all members of the public.
As to the first of these affirmative defenses, explicit consent to enter or
remain, the defense has the burden of offering evidence to raise this
argument." Once this occurs, the State has the burden to disprove the
presence of explicit consent beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 As to the second
of these two affirmative defenses, the Supreme Court of Florida recently
clarified the respective burdens in the "open to the public" affirmative
defense in Miller v. State.1
3
In Miller, the State charged Miller with multiple offenses stemming
from the holdup of a grocery store, committed with the aid of his juvenile
10. Id.
11. Jones v. State, 745 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). As consent is an
affirmative defense, an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a burglary charge waives
this defense. Id.
12. For a recent case discussing this in detail, see D.R., where a trailer owner had given
the defendant permission to stay in the trailer several nights before the owner locked the trailer up
and moved his family elsewhere. D.R. v. State, 734 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
The defendant admitted going inside the trailer while the owner was away but claimed he
believed he had the owner's permission to do so. Id. at 458. At trial, the owner testified that it
was his understanding that D.R. could not go inside until the owner returned. Id. at 457-58.
However, this testimony was insufficient to prove revocation of consent to enter, as it only went
to the owner's state of mind, not the accused's knowledge of the consent's revocation. Id. at 460.
As "[n]othing in the record suggests that consent to enter, once given to D.R., was ever
withdrawn expressly or by implication and communicated to him," the State failed to meet its
burden. Id.
For another recent case on this point, see Medina, where the court found that after
permission to enter is given, the mere fact that the accused subsequently commits a crime inside a
protected place does not automatically require a finding that consent to remain was revoked.
Medina v. State, 743 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1999).
Any alleged consent to enter that has been obtained by trick or fraud will not be considered
valid or lawful consent for purposes of avoiding a conviction. For a recent case on this issue, see
Gordon, where initial entry was gained through a ruse in which the defendant pretended to have a
toothache. Gordon v. State, 745 So. 2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
However, the lawful occupant does not have to explicitly tell an accused to leave. Ray v.
State, 522 So. 2d 963, 966 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a defendant who entered
another's apartment with consent had unlawfully remained there for purposes of a burglary when
the occupant fought with the defendant when he tried to sexually assault her). Consent to remain
after a lawful entry can be revoked implicitly. Id.
13. 733 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1998).
[Vol. 25:1
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nephew.14 The two entered the store in the late afternoon armed with a
rifle.15 They disarmed the store's security guard, shot both the guard and the
store's operator, took money from the cash register, and fled. The operator
recovered, but the guard died from injuries caused by his wounds.17 Miller
was subsequently arrested and found guilty on all the charges against
him: first-degree murder; attempted first-degree murder with use of a
firearm; armed robbery with a firearm; robbery with a firearm; and
burglary. 8 The judge followed the jury's unanimous recommendation and
sentenced Miller to death.19
On appeal, Miller raised no issue regarding thezguilt phase of his trial,
but raised six issues regarding the penalty phase. However, upon an
independent review of the record, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed his
burglary conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new
penalty phase hearing.21 The court believed that there had been some
confusion regarding the "open to the public" affirmative defense, as opposed
to the licensee or invitee affirmative defense in the "consent clause" of
section 810.02(1) of the Florida Statutes.22 The court subsequently held that
"if a defendant can establish that the premises were open to the public, then
this is a complete defense." 23  Thus, even if an accused enters an area
publicly open, and the lawful occupants subsequently withdraw consent, this
will still not make the accused guilty of burglary.2 A finding otherwise was
considered not only to be in direct conflict with explicit language in the
14. Id. at 955. The nephew was a prosecution witness against Miller at trial. Id. at 956.
The opinion does not indicate what charges were brought against the nephew or what ultimately
happened to him. See id.
15. Id.
16. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 956. Three other people were also inside the store at the time,
including two children. Id. The nephew, who shot the store's operator, claimed that the shooting
was accidental. Id. The opinion contains no facts as to why the guard was shot after being
disarmed or why the two did not shoot any of the other four occupants. See id. at 955.
17. Id. at 956.
18. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 955.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 956.
21. Id. at 957. The court found a new sentencing hearing was needed, as its decision
invalidated the "committed during the course of a burglary" aggravating factor in Miller's case.
Id. The court declined to find that use of this improper factor was harmless error. Miller, 733 So.
2d at 957.
22. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 810.01(1) (2000).
23. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
24. See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 750 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting the argument that once an accused entered a 24-hour convenience store and demanded
money, consent for him to be there was implicitly revoked as the employees knew he was only
there to commit a crime).
200]
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consent clause of section 810.02(1),25 but also would produce absurd results.
For example, a thief would automatically be guilty of burglary whenever
entering a store to secretly steal an item, no matter how open to the public
the premises would be.26 As the State conceded that the store Miller robbed
was open to the public, his burglary conviction was reversed.27
Several subsequent cases show that the principle established in Miller
could be extended too far. Business areas may have a dual nature or
character; that is, part of them may, by virtue of the business engaged in, be
open to the public, and part of them may be closed to the public. When
defendants go beyond the publicly open areas with the intent to commit a
crime, they may easily find themselves being charged and convicted of
burglary. Thus, a defendant who gained access through deception to a hotel
manager's private office even though his entry into the hotel's lobby had
been to a public area,2 a defendant who dove head first through a
restaurant's drive-up window to take cash,29 and a defendant who entered a
locked, gated employee area of a cellular telephone store,30 all were found
guilty of burglary.
m0. POSSESSION OF BURGLARY TOOLS
The Supreme Court of Florida also recently decided an important case
concerning possession of burglary tools. Section 810.06 of the Florida
Statutes states that "[w]hoever has in his or her possession any tool,
machine, or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be
used, to commit any burglary or trespass" commits a crime.31 In Calliar v.
State,32 a teacher saw Calliar on school property trying to break a bicycle's
chain with wire cutters and a screwdriver. Calliar had entered the property
through an open gate in a fence and was trying to get the bicycle unchained
from a rack in the school's fenced area. Calliar was subsequently
25. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
26. Ray v. State, 522 So. 2d. 963, 967 n.6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (citing a similar
factual situation it deemed ridiculous in State v. Shult, 380 N.W.2d 352 (S.D. 1985), where a
pizza thief was convicted of burglary for entering a store with intent to shoplift).
27. Miller, 733 So. 2d at 957.
28. Thomas v. State, 742 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
29. Fine v. State, 758 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
30. Millian v. State, 758 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
31. FLA. STAT. § 810.06(2000). This section makes the crime a third-degree felony. Id.
32. 760 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1999).
33. Id. at 885.
34. Id.
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convicted of possession of burglary tools, burglary of an occupied structure,
and resisting an officer without violence.
35
Calliar appealed his conviction for possession of burglary tools,
claiming that section 810.06 only criminalizes possession of tools with intent
to use them to commit burglary or trespass, not theft.36 The First District
Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction 37 and rejected the contrary
reasoning of the Third District in Hierro v. State.38 The First District
criticized the Hierro court as having "ignored... that the intent to commit
the theft at the time of the illegal entry is an element of the crime of
burglary. The two charges should not be treated as separate incidents, but
rather as one criminal episode with a unified intent.
39
The Supreme Court of Florida, in a short, well-reasoned opinion,
quashed the district court's opinion.4 The court cited with approval,
Hierro's reasoning that the explicit statutory language of section 810.06
required 'not merely that the accused intended to commit a burglary or
trespass while those tools were in his possession, but that the accused
actually intended to use those tools to perpetrate the crime."' 41 The court
thus held that "the crime of possession of burglary tools is just what it
appears to be: possession of tools used or intended to be used to unlawfully
enter the premises of another. '42  Several reasons supported this
interpretation. First, under the plain meaning rule, a court must give words
in a statute their plain meaning.3 Here, that meant "burglary tools" should
only be considered as those tools actually used or intended for use in a
burglary or trespass, and not merely tools that were intended to commit
another crime once the trespass or burglary was accomplished. 44 Under
section 810.02(1), all Calliar needed to commit a burglary was an unlawful
entry of a statutorily protected place "with the intent to commit an additional
offense."4S Second, the court found that a contrary construction would lead
to absurd results, since as long as an accused possessed something that was
intended to commit any other crime after an illegal entry, the accused would
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Calliarv. State, 714 So. 2d 1134, 1134 (Fla. 1stDist. Ct. App. 1998).
38. 608 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1992).
39. Calliar, 714 So. 2d at 1135.
40. Calliar v. State, 760 So. 2d 885, 887-88 (Fa. 1999).
41. Id. at 886 (quoting Thomas v. State, 531 So. 2d 708, 709 (Fla. 1988)) (emphasis
omitted).
42. Id. at 887.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Calliar, 760 So. 2d at 887 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1995)). For a more
detailed discussion of burglary see supra notes 2-30 and accompanying text.
20001
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be guilty of possession of burglary tools.46 Instead, the court found that the
tools possessed must be used to commit a burglary or trespass for section
810.06 to be violated.47 In this case, since there was no evidence that the
wirecutters or screwdriver had been used to help Calliar burglarize or
trespass on school grounds, his burglary conviction was reversed.48
IV. POSSESSION OF CONCEALED WEAPONS OR FIREARMS
Florida's substantive criminal law makes the possession of a weapon or
firearm a crime in a variety of circumstances. The possession may be
criminal depending on the status of the possessor,49 the nature of the weapon
46. Callier, 760 So. 2d at 887.
47. Id. The court could have possibly cited to a third rationale to support its decision.
Assuming the court found ambiguity in the statutory language of section 810.06, the court could
have then relied on the rule of leniency, which requires a court to strictly construe criminal
statutes in favor of the accused.
48. Id.
49. FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1) (2000) (making possession of a firearm, electric weapon, or
concealed weapon illegal if the possessor is a convicted felon or has been found delinquent of an
offense that would have been a felony for an adult, and the possessor is under 24 years of age).
Until 1999, if the possessor had been adjudicated delinquent, but the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over him or her had expired or been relinquished, then the accused would not have been a
delinquent in possession. § 790.23(2). The 1999 Legislature amended section 790.23 to extend
the applicable age of former delinquents from 18, when juvenile court jurisdiction over them
expires, until 24. Ch. 99-284, § 39, 1999 Fla. Laws 3133, 3133 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 790.23(1) (2000)).
For a recent case involving offenses under this subsection, see Adkins, where the court
found that the felon defendant could not be convicted of possession of a firear where the
firearm was found in the trunk of his girlfriend's car that he happened to be driving, and there
was no proof he knew of its presence. Adkins v. State, 738 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1999). Further, in Bullis, the court found that the accused could be convicted of a felony charge
for possession of firearm based upon the testimony of a deputy sheriff placing the accused inside
a motor home where weapons were found scattered about in the open. Bullis v. State, 734 So. 2d
463 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
For an important recent decision holding that voluntary intoxication is not an available
defense to violations of section 790.23 of the Florida Statutes, as these are general, rather than
specific, intent crimes, see Goodwin v. State, 734 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
Section 790.235(1) of the Florida Statutes makes it a crime for a violent career criminal to
"own[] or ha[ve] in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm or electric
weapon... or carr[y] a concealed weapon." In Jackson, the court recently rejected due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto attacks on the statutory predecessor to section 790.235.
Jackson v. State, 729 So. 2d 947, 949-50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
For another recent case involving this subsection, see Jacobs, where the court found that
the accused was properly convicted of being a violent career criminal in possession of a firearm
[Vol. 25:1
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or firearm possessed,5° how the weapon or firearm is possessed,5' or the
geographical area where the weapon or firearm is possessed.52 Recently, the
Supreme Court of Florida decided an important case clarifying the test to be
used and factors to be considered in determining whether a weapon or
firearm was possessed in a "concealed" fashion.
5 3
In Dorelus v. State, the defendant and a co-defendant, Presume, were
in a car stopped for a traffic violation.55 The defendant was the driver, and
the co-defendant was a passenger.5 6  While standing outside the car, the
officer who stopped them claimed, according to his probable cause affidavit,
that he saw "'the shiny silver butt of a handgun... located underneath the
when a handgun was found partially hidden under the driver's seat of the car he was seen driving,
and the car's owner testified it was not hers. Jacobs v. State, 742 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1999).
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.221 (2000) (making it a crime to possess a short-barreled
rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or a machine gun); § 790.225 (making possession of self-propelled
knives illegal).
51. Sections 790.01(1) and (2) of the Florida Statutes make it a crime to possess
concealed or electric weapons or concealed firearms. § 790.01(1), (2). However, a person may
be licensed to carry a concealed weapon or firearm pursuant to section 790.06, or lawfully carry
such concealed weapons even without a license if the weapon or firearm is in a "private
conveyance... [and] is securely encased or is otherwise not readily accessible for immediate
use" pursuant to section 790.25(5). § 790.25(5). Section 790.053 makes it a crime to openly
carry a firearm or device. § 790.053.
52. See, e.g., § 790.115(1)-(2) (making it a crime to possess firearms or weapons on
school property or at school-sponsored events). But see RLLS. v. State, 732 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d
Dist. CL App. 1999) (finding that the accused could not be convicted of possessing a weapon on
school property when the knife he had was so short-bladed that it fell within the "common
pocketknife" exception to the definition of a weapon under section 790.001(13)).
For another recent case discussing this exception, see Walls, where the court found that a
knife approximately nine inches long and carried with the blade locked open could be considered
a weapon for purposes of a conviction. Walls v. State, 730 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App.
1999).
For detailed discussion of the "common pocketknife" exception, see LB. v. State, 700 So.
2d 370 (Fla. 1997).
53. Dorelus v. State, 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999). The case only involved a charge of
carrying a concealed firearm. Id. at 370. However, the supreme court noted that since the critical
statutory language concerning what constitutes concealment was the same for both concealed
firearms and concealed weapons, its decision should be applicable to both offenses. Id.
54. 747 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1999).
55. Id. at 369.
56. These facts come from the district court's opinion in the co-defendant's case. State
v. Presume, 710 So. 2d 604, 604 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1998). The opinions in both the
defendant's and the co-defendant's cases are silent as to where the co-defendant, Presume, was
sitting when the car was stopped; however, the facts imply that he was in the front seaL See id. at
605.
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radio."'57 The officer arrested both men for carrying a concealed weapon.
Before trial, both Presume and Dorelus separately filed sworn motions to
dismiss. 59 The State filed a traverse to Presume's motion, denying its
material allegations.60 At the hearing on the motion, the State argued
unsuccessfully that it needed to present the arresting officer's testimony to
show how the gun was concealed.61 The prosecution additionally argued
that the question of concealment was a matter of fact for the jury and thus
not the proper subject of a motion to dismiss.62 However, after examining
the officer's probable cause affidavit, the trial court rejected these arguments
and granted Presume's motion. 63 Dorelus' motion was filed after his co-
defendant's successful hearing.64 Dorelus' motion asked the court to
judicially notice the order granting his co-defendant's motion to dismiss. 65
The State did not traverse this time but instead relied on its arguments in the
previous case.6 Once again, the motion to dismiss was granted.6__68
The State appealed both orders dismissing the charges.68 In both cases,
the district court of appeal reversed.69 Both opinions found that the trial
court had erred by granting the motions based on the appellate court's
findings that whether a weapon is concealed is a question for the trier of fact
and never a question of law,70 relying on the supreme court's decision in
Ensor v. State.71 Dorelus subsequently appealed the decision in his case to
the supreme court.72
57. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370. The Fourth District's opinion in Presume noted that the
affidavit also alleged the gun was "'easily accessible to both the defendant & co-defendant."'
Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604.
58. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
59. Id. Both motions were filed pursuant to FIA. R. CUM. P. 3.190(c)(4).
60. Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604-05.
61. Id. at 605.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 604.
69. Dorelus, 720 So. 2d at 543; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 606.
70. Dorelus, 720 So. 2d at 543; Presume, 710 So. 2d at 606. The Presume opinion also
found that the State's traverse, along with the statements in the arresting officer's probable cause
affidavit, created an issue of material fact for a jury. Id. at 605.
71. 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981). The court in Ensor held that a firearm may be within a
police officer's sight for purposes of invoking the "plain view" doctrine to support a warrantless
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and still be found to be a "concealed firearm" under section
790.001(2). Id. at 351.
72. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
[Vol. 25:1
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss1/2
Adams /Dobson
In an important, well-organized opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
quashed the appellate court's decision.73  The court noted that section
790.001(2) of .the Florida Statutes defined a concealed firearm as one
"carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal the firearm
from the ordinary sight of another person. ' 74 It agreed with the Fourth
District's characterization of Ensor as the seminal case discussing when a
weapon or firearm is considered "concealed" under section 790.001.75 The
court in Ensor found that a firearm does not have to be totally out of sight to
be considered concealed.7 6 Rather, the test for concealment was whether the
firearm was "hidden from the ordinary sight of another person.' 7 7 "Ordinary
sight of another person" was in turn defined as "the casual and ordinary
observation of another in the normal associations of life."78 The court
declared that this would depend "on whether an individual, standing near a
person with a firearm or beside a vehicle in which a person with a firearm is
seated, may by ordinary observation know the questioned object to be a
firearm." 79 According to Ensor, this question "must rest upon the trier of
fact under the circumstances of each case."go
The supreme court in Dorelus noted that Ensor has been interpreted as
standing for the proposition that concealment is always a question of fact
and never a question of law which could be decided on a motion to dismiss.
8 1
Dorelus rejected this broad interpretation of Ensor and clarified that what
the court in that case meant to say was that "the issue of concealment is
ordinarily an issue for the trier of fact., 82 The court also noted that Ensor
may have been misleading in another respect, viz., the extent to which its
83discussion focused on the observer's viewpoint. Instead, to be consistent
with the statutory definition of "concealed firearm," the Dorelus court
declared that the emphasis should be on "the manner," that is, how someone
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 790.001(2) (1995)). This language is the same as that
currently found in that section. See FLA. STAT § 790.001(2) (2000). The same language is also
found in the statutory definition of a "concealed weapon." § 790.001(3)(a).
75. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370.
76. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 354.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Id.
81. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 371.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 372.
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carries the firearm.84 This manner of carrying would again focus on whether
the firearm involved was out of "the ordinary sight of another person."8 5
The supreme court's opinion, besides clarifying earlier statements in
Ensor, is especially helpful because the court also discussed in some detail
what factors are and are not relevant in determining if the manner in which
86the firearm is carried means it should be considered concealed. Factors
which Dorelus deemed relevant to whether the manner of carrying the
firearm made it concealed included where it was inside a vehicle, how
much or how little it was covered by another object,88 whether an accused
used his/her body to conceal what would otherwise be ordinarily visible,
8 9
and "the nature and type of weapon involved." 90 Finally, as to relevant
factors, the court said that the police officers' observations are important. 9'
Thus, a statement that the officer could "immediately recognize" an object as
a weapon may conclusively show it was not concealed. However, just
because an officer cannot or did not immediately make such a recognition
would not automatically mean a jury could find that an object was
concealed.93 This contrary result is rational, since a weapon may be
immediately visible in the open if viewed from one position but not from
another one. Likewise, someone may not see a firearm or weapon that is in
the open just because the person does not happen to be looking in that
direction or may be just careless in his or her observation. An observer's
viewpoint or lack of attention should not determine if how an object is
carried makes it concealed, as this would make the issue depend on factors
totally beyond the control of the person accused of carrying it in a concealed
fashion.9' -
84. Id.
85. Id. at 371.
86. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 370-72.
87. Id. at 371. Places specifically mentioned in this regard included "the floorboard, the
seat, a seat pocket, or an open console." Id.
88. Id. The objects mentioned as examples were "a sheet or a towel." Id.
89. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 371-72. The court gave as an example a Second District case
where a driver leaned over a weapon located between the seats and tried to put one arm over the
weapon's butt to prevent a police officer from seeing it. Id. (discussing State v. Hankerson, 430
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
90. Id. at 372. The court noted that rifles are more difficult to conceal than handguns,
and that obviously smaller firearms can be concealed more easily than larger ones. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 372.
93. Id. at 371.
94. Id. at 372. The court rejected the First District's reasoning which found that a
firearm caried in a stopped car could be concealed even though the officer looking through a
passenger side window could readily see it but the officer looking through the driver's side
(Vol. 25:1
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The court rejected the State's argument that other factors extraneous to
how the weapon involved was carried may be relevant to whether it was
concealed or not.95 Thus, time of day and whether a vehicle's window is
open or closed should not be considered in making this determination. The
court felt that using such factors would create the risk that the concealed
weapons and firearm law would be unconstitutionally vague.9
Looking at the actual facts in Dorelus and applying the appropriate
factors as to how the firearm was carried, the supreme court agreed with the
trial court's determination that, as a matter of law, it was not concealed.
97
There was no dispute it was in an open console with the butt of the handgun
sticking out. The handgun was not covered, and the defendant made no
attempt at all to use his body to shield the gun from the officer's view.
99
Finally, the officer had no difficulty recognizing it as a firearm.l°°
When the court's reasoning is examined in light of some of criminal
law's basic principles, the correctness of this decision becomes even more
evident. One of the basic principles of criminal law in a free, democratic
society is that citizens should be able to govern their conduct to avoid the
potentially coercive effects that criminal law can impose on them through
charging, conviction, and ultimately punishment. Before citizens can govern
their conduct so as to avoid the possibility of conviction and punishment,
they must know what conduct will violate the law. A second basic principle
is that citizens should only be punished for factors, usually action or
inaction, within their own control, not someone else's. The court furthered
both of these principles by elaborating on those factors that may make a
weapon or firearm concealed. First, it provided better notice to citizens, as
well as to the courts, regarding what conduct to avoid so as not to run the
risk of being charged and convicted of carrying a concealed item. Second,
the conduct to avoid is limited to factors that citizens who might be charged
with carrying a concealed weapon can avoid, because it is their own conduct,
window could not. Id. (discussing McGraw v. State, 404 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App.
1981)). As the Dorelus court said, "[w]hether a crime has occurred should not depend on
whether the officer's initial vantage point is the driver's rather than the passenger's side of the
automobile." Id.
95. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 373. One extraneous factor the court did not mention is the
weather. This, too, should be considered irrelevant, as it is outside the accused possessor's
control. Why should a weapon resting uncovered on the back seat of a car be considered
concealed because it cannot be readily seen through a rain-fogged window but would be readily
seen in the exact same spot on a clear, sunny day?
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 373.
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and not someone else's, on which a charge would be brought. Citizens may
not always be able to control how observant an officer is, but they can
control how secluded a weapon is by where it is placed, what covers it, and
what actions are taken or not taken to try or not try to hide it with the body.
At the conclusion of its opinion, the supreme court suggested that the
legislature should consider amending the law "to set forth the exact
parameters for carrying a weapon [or firearm] in a vehicle in this state."101
The court cited three groups that would benefit from such a statutory
clarification.10 2 First, police would benefit because they would better know
when to arrest for a concealed weapon violation. 13 Second, citizens would
benefit because, as mentioned above, they would better know how to
transport certain items legally.104 Finally, courts would benefit because it is
they who must decide whether a weapon has been carried in a prohibited
manner.1
05
At least through the 1999 session, the Florida legislature has not acted
on the court's suggestion. However, the Dorelus opinion will still be useful
to all three groups, especially the trial courts. When called upon to make the
initial judgment as to whether a person has unlawfully carried a concealed
firearm or weapon, trial judges should look to Dorelus for guidance.
Furthermore, unless and until the legislature acts upon the supreme court's
suggestion, trial judges may wish to consider instructing juries on those
factors Dorelus has explicitly declared relevant and irrelevant when a jury
trial is involved. Finally, strong consideration should be given to amending
the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in criminal cases to incorporate these
factors for charges related to carrying concealed weapons or firearms.'0
6
V. MANSLAUGHTER: OMISSIONS, CAUSATION,
AND CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE
Substantive criminal law sometimes, but not always, requires that there
be a harmful result for there to be a crime. When such a harmful result
101. Id. at 374.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Dorelus, 747 So. 2d at 374.
106. For another recent case involving carrying concealed firearms, see Walker. Walker
v. State, 733 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999). In Walker, there was no question that
firearms carried in a car Walker drove and shared with a passenger were concealed. See id. at
564. However, there was no direct or even circumstantial evidence, such as Walker's fingerprints
on any of the guns, to show he knew of their presence. Id. at 564-65. Thus, Walker could not
even be convicted on a theory of constructive possession with ajoint occupant. Id. at 564.
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occurs, criminal law further requires that it be the result of an accused's act.
This second requirement is the requirement of causation. Usually, when a
harmful result occurs, causation is self-evident. However, occasionally
cases arise where the issue of causation raises serious problems. These
issues almost always arise in the context of homicide prosecutions. A
homicide prosecution requires proof of a harmful result, the killing of a
human being, as well as proof of causation, by another human being. Where
the killing stems solely from a voluntary act of the accused, both elements
are easily satisfied. For instance, if one person pulls a gun and shoots
another person, killing the second person instantly, both the killing and the
causation through human agency are obvious. However, when the killing
occurs through the alleged omission, rather than commission, of another,
then serious questions of causation can arise. The Supreme Court of Florida
recently addressed the issues of causation and omissions in Eversley v.
State."" This case also gave the court an opportunity to discuss culpable
negligence and Florida's felony child abuse statute.108
Eversley was charged with manslaughter and felony child abuse
stemming from the death of her infant son, Isaiah.1°9 When Isaiah was born,
the defendant contracted with another woman to keep and to care for him as
Eversley felt she could not do so because of her work.110 Two months later,
Eversley decided to care for Isaiah herself, showed up at the woman's home,
and took him with her."' The next day, Isaiah began to act as if he were
sick.11 2 Eversley took him to a clinic where medical staff, including a
doctor, repeatedly told her that he might have pneumonia and that she
needed to take him to a hospital for immediate testing.1 3 Eversley took the
baby to a hospital emergency room but left without having him examined
because she became impatient while waiting for doctors to see several
people ahead of her.114 That evening, Isaiah continued to show signs of
11516labored breathing. Eversley went to sleep with him lying next to her.16When she woke up in the early morning hours the next day, she noticed he
107. 748 So. 2d 963 (Fa. 1999).
108. Id. at968-70.
109. Id.at964.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 964.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 965.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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was not breathing. 1 7 Paramedics were summoned and found that Isaiah had
been dead for some time.118
At trial, cause of death was a major issue.119 Eversley claimed the baby
was sick when she first picked him up at the other woman's home.
However, both the woman and Eversley's aunt, who had also seen Isaiah that
day, said he was not sick when Eversley picked him up. 12 1 Nurses and the
doctor at the clinic testified about the repeated admonitions they had given
Eversley concerning the need for the baby to receive testing at a hospital.
122
Eversley herself admitted that she knew if she had told the hospital
emergency room staff she had been sent there by a doctor, Isaiah would have
been seen ahead of the people who were there before her.123 She claimed she
believed the baby only had a cold, but this testimony was countered by the
clinic staff who testified they specifically told her he might have
pneumonia.'2 At trial, medical experts for both sides differed in their
estimates of Isaiah's chances for survival had he been given prompt medical
care. 125 The defense's expert estimated that the mortality rate for the type of
pneumonia the baby had was twenty-five percent, thus giving him only a
seventy-five percent chance of survival even with adequate care.'2 The
State's expert put the mortality rate at only one percent, assuming adequate
medical care.
The jury convicted Eversley of manslaughter and felony child abuse,
but the trial court, in ruling on the defense's post trial motion for judgment
of acquittal, overturned the manslaughter conviction and reduced the child
abuse conviction to a misdemeanor. The trial court based its ruling on the
supreme court's early decision in Bradley v. State,129 which it read as finding
that a parent's failure to provide medical care for a sick child can never be
considered the legal cause of the child's death.130 The State appealed and
the district court reinstated both the manslaughter and felony child abuse
117. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 964.
121. Id.
122. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 964.
123. State v. Eversley, 706 So. 2d 1363, 1365-66 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
124. Id. at 1366.
125. See Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 964.
129. 84 So. 677 (Fla. 1920).
130. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965.
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convictions.13 The defense subsequently appealed this decision to thesupreme court hbpe
As both the district court and the supreme court's opinions discussed
Bradley, an examination of that decision is helpful. In Bradley, the
defendant's epileptic daughter fell into a fire during a seizure and was
severely burned.' This occurred on April 26." From then until May 30,
the defendant repeatedly refused to have her seen by a doctor, although
relatives and even a justice of the peace urged him to do so. 135 Bradley
apparently could have paid for the medical attention and turned down offers
from others to pay for a doctor to examine his daughter. 136 The father told
anyone who urged him to seek medical treatment for his daughter that he
was relying on the will of God, and that "the greatest physician was God
himself. ' 137 Finally, the daughter was taken to a state hospital where she
died on June 22. Bradley was charged with manslaughter by culpable
negligence. 139 At trial, the doctors who treated his daughter testified she
would have recovered from the burns if-prompt medical care had been given,
and that the burns were the cause of her death. 140
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. 141 The statute under which the
State charged Bradley defined manslaughter as "[tihe killing of a human
being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, in cases
where such killing shall not be justifiable or excusable homicide nor
murder."1 42 Justice Whitfield, in his majority opinion, first invoked as the
basis for reversal the principle of legali, that is, that no act can be a crime
unless the legislature has made it so. According to Justice Whitfield,
"statutes creating and defining crimes cannot be extended by intendment,
and that no act, however wron.ul, can be punished under such a statute
unless clearly within its terms." Justice Whitfield found that there was no
state law "specifically making the failure or refusal of a father to provide
medical attention for his child a felony, and [that] the general [statutory]
131. Id.
132. See id.at 964.
133. Bradley, 84 So. at 679 (West, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 679-80.
136. Id. at 680.
137. Id. at 681.
138. Bradley, 84 So. at 680.
139. Id. at 681.
140. Id. at 680.
141. Id. at 679.
142. Id. at 678 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 3209 (1906)).
143. See Bradley, 84 So. at 678-79.
144. Id. at 679.
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definition of 'manslaughter'... does not appear to cover a case of this
nature.' 45 Looking at both the indictment's allegations and the evidence at
trial, the justice then found no proof the girl had been killed "by the
[defendant's] act, procurement or culpable negligence."'9 46 Justice Whitfield
concluded by asserting that even if the girl would have recovered, the cause
of her death was accidentally being burned, not her father's failure to get
prompt care.147 Thus, "even if the failure or refusal of the father to provide
medical attention was 'culpable negligence' within the intent of the statute,"
this culpable negligence would not have caused the daughter's death.14
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Browne agreed that the
conviction should be reversed. 149  Although his concurrence purports to
address a number of different questions, all of them seem to be directed to
the issue of causation. 50 Browne believed that whatever the State's claims
factually and legally, it had not met its burden of proof as to causation.'
5
'
Thus, he claimed that "it was not proven, and was not capable of being
proven that if the child had had medical attention it would have
recovered.'
52
Justice West wrote an extensive dissent.153 He began by asserting that
"[a]ll the essential elements of the offense charged in the
indictment.., were proved." ' 4 That being so, he found only two questions
that needed to be addressed: did the facts proven "make a case of
manslaughter within the terms of the statute," and, if so, did the defendant's
religious beliefs provide a "sufficient justification or excuse for his failure to
secure any medical treatment for his daughter?"' 55  The first question
addressed Justice Whitfield's principle of legality argument.,5 6 Justice West
noted that a father owes a legal duty to his minor children to provide the
necessities of life, if possible?.57 Thus, a father must provide his children
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Bradley, 84 So. at 679.
149. Id. (Browne, J., concurring).
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Justice Browne believed that the State could never factually prove causation in a
case like this "until the practice of medicine becomes an exact science so that it can be established
beyond the peradventure of a doubt that death would not have ensued if a physician had been in
attendance." Bradley, 84 So. at 679.
153. Id. at 679-83 (West, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 680.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Bradley,84So.at681.
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with food, clothing, shelter, and medical care if he can.158 Failure to do so
could be culpable negligence in West's oinion, thus coming within the
prohibition of the manslaughter statute. Having answered the first
question affirmatively, the dissent cited a number of cases from other
jurisdictions all concluding that defendants' personal religious beliefs will
not exonerate them when their actions otherwise break the law.16 Thus,
Justice West found Bradley's religious belief in leaving the matter of his
daughter's recovery solely in God's hands neither a justification nor an
excuse for failing to get her prompt medical care.
61
The Bradley majority opinion is a confusing combination of legal and
factual justifications for reversal. The first basis, the principle of legality,
would mean that the accused could never be convicted of manslaughter
under the law at the time, as his omissions did not fall within the statute's
prohibition. This could be so either because Justice Whitfield believed that
an omission could never give rise to criminal liability unless there was a
statute specifically declaring that such liability existed, or because even if
omissions could sometimes give rise to criminal liability under the
manslaughter statute, the father's omissions did not do so here as a matter of
law. Justice Whitfield's comments regarding "no proof' provided at least
two additional bases for reversal. 162 First, the Justice may have believed that
the State had not presented sufficient medical testimony to prove causation.
Second, even if the State had proved causation, it had not offered enough
evidence to prove the accused was culpably negligent here. Unfortunately,
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 681-83.
161. Id. at 683. Neither the majority nor concurring opinions directly discuss whether
Bradley's beliefs could have been a reason to exonerate him. Reading both of these opinions,
one cannot help but feel that possibly the justices silently felt that maybe Bradley was a good man
who had "suffered enough," but the justices were at the same time hesitant to endorse the notion
that a person's religious beliefs can be a reason not to hold someone criminally responsible.
Justice Whitfield's opinion refers to "[whatever motive may have prompted the father" and notes
that the father was not charged with willfully depriving the daughter of medical attention.
Bradley, 84 So. at 679. To an extent, this is a true statement, as Bradley was not charged with
violating an existing statute making it a crime to "willfully deprive his child of necessary medical
attention." Id. at 678 (citing RLA. STAT. § 3238 (1906)). Certainly, though, as the word
"willfully" is commonly understood, Bradley's inaction was willful; his child needed medical
help, and he made the decision not to provide it promptly because of his religious beliefs.
Chief Justice Browne asked whether a father "who belongs to that exemplary band of
Christians who have no faith in the efficacy of medicine as a curative agency," should be
convicted when he does not provide necessary medical care to a child who dies. Id. at 679.
Of course, there is no way of knowing whether these two justices did indeed silently cast
their votes to overturn the conviction on this basis.
162. Id.
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Justice Whitfield's opinion never clarifies which one or ones of these three
grounds he relies upon in reversing the conviction.
1 63
In Eversley, the district court of appeal reversed the trial court's order
overturning the manslaughter conviction and reducing the child abuse
conviction to a misdemeanor.1" The district court noted that the trial court
had read Bradley to mean that a parent's failure to provide needed medical
care could never be the legal cause of death. 65 The district court believed
that continued reliance on Bradley for this proposition was inconsistent with
the development of Florida's laws regarding the protection of children.
16
Unlike the state of the law in 1906, Florida law in effect when Eversley was
decided provided extensive protection for children and explicitly made
parental failure to obtain medical care for a sick child a serious crime.
67
Thus, parents who willfully failed to provide medical care to their child
could be prosecuted for manslaughter provided three elements were
proven.1 68 The defendant had to: 1) cause the child's death; 2) do so by
culpable negligence; and 3) have no lawful justification for doing so.
Culpable negligence would exist "when a defendant recklessly or wantonly
disregards the safety of another." 170  As for causation, the district court
believed that this concept had been significantly liberalized in modem
manslaughter cases. 171 No longer did the State have to prove that "but for"
an accused's acts or omissions, the death would not have occurred.
1 72
Instead, causation would lie "when a defendant's action is a material
contributing factor in the victim's death.'1
3
Applying these two standards, the district court first concluded that a
jury could find Eversley culpably negligent. 74 Her actions in leaving the
163. Id. at 678-79. Unfortunately, Justice Whitfield also mentions all three grounds in
the same paragraph, thus adding to the difficulty of determining his grounds for reversal. Bradley,
84 So. at 678.
164. State v. Eversley, 706 So. 2d 1363, 1364 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
165. Id. at 1365.
166. Id.
167. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1995). This section was subsequently changed and
incorporated into section 827.03 of the Florida Statutes. For a brief discussion of the changes,
see infra notes 226-29 and accompanying text.
Florida criminal law when Bradley was decided in 1906 made depriving a child of needed
medical care a crime; however, it was only a misdemeanor. FLA. STAT. § 3238 (1906).
168. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365.
174. Id. at 1366.
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hospital emergency room without having her child treated or even examined,
after having been advised by doctors of the baby's potentially serious
medical situation, "epitomize[d] willful and wanton recklessness." 75 As to
causation, the medical testimony established that "[t]here was a significant
chance that, given medical aid, Isaiah could have survived his bout of
pneumonia." '  Since the defendant's failure to get him that aid deprived the
baby of that chance for life, there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury
to conclude the mother's actions and omissions contributed to his death.
177
Finally, the district court reinstated the felony child abuse conviction. 17
The 1995 statute under which Eversley was charged with criminal child
abuse made it a third-degree felony to "willfully or by culpable negligence,
depriv[e] a child of... necessary... medical treatment... and in so doing
caus[e] great bodily harm ... to such child., 179 The district court's opinion
does not even discuss culpable negligence as far as a conviction under this
law. 180  Instead, "Eversley's capricious decision to leave the emergency
room, despite her knowledge that she could obtain immediate assistance,
evidence[d] a specific and willful intent to deny Isaiah medical services."''
The Supreme Court of Florida, in an extensive discussion of causation
and culpable negligence, reversed the district court's finding that Eversley
could be convicted of manslaughter, but upheld the court's finding that she
was guilty of felony child abuse.182 The supreme court first noted that thelanguage of the two manslaughter statutes under which Bradley 83 and
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. Once again, the district court found that Bradley presented an antiquated view
which should no longer be followed. Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1365. The court rejected Justice
Browne's reasoning in his concurring opinion that causation was factually incapable of being
proved in these types of cases. Id. at 1366. "Medical science has progressed significantly since
the days when 'it was not capable of being proven that if the child had had medical attention it
would have recovered."' Id. (quoting Bradley v. State, 84 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1920)).
178. Id.
179. FLA. STAT. § 827.04(1) (1995).
180. See Eversley, 706 So. 2d at 1363-66.
181. Id. at 1366. The district court's opinion does not discuss whether culpable
negligence for purposes of a manslaughter conviction is the same as for a child abuse conviction.
Presumably the definitions would be the same, as the same term is used in both statutes and thus
should be given the same meaning unless an explicit legislative intent to do otherwise is shown.
As the district court found Eversley guilty of willful child abuse, one can assume it also would
alternatively have found her guilty of child abuse by culpable negligence.
182. Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 970 (Fla. 1999).
183. FLA. STAT. § 3209 (1906). See supra note 142 and accompanying text for the*
language of this statute.
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Eversley' 4 were prosecuted is substantially the same. 85 The supreme court
agreed with the district court as to the three elements needed to prove
manslaughter under these statutes.186 However, the supreme court disagreed
with the district court's opinion in its analysis of causation and culpable
negligence. 187
Eversley examined the majority's opinion in Bradley and found it
"rather ambiguous," especially on the issue of causation. 8  The supreme
court disagreed with the district court's finding that the "but for" test for
cause-in-fact causation need no longer be satisfied, and that instead cause-in-
fact causation could be established by using a "material contributing factor"
test. 89 As Eversley correctly recognized, causation in criminal law consists
of two parts.19° First, "but for" causation must be found before an accused
can be potentially criminally liable.'91 However, this alone is not enough for
criminal responsibility to be imposed. 92 There must be a second category of
causation, usually called legal causation. 193  Only when both types of
causation exist can criminal responsibility be found.' 94 As to "but for"
causation, in Eversley the supreme court noted that "the State usually must
demonstrate that 'but for' the defendant's conduct, the harm would not have
occurred.', 195 If a harm would have occurred anyway despite the accused's
conduct, then "but for" causation is not satisfied, and there should be no
criminal responsibility for the harm.116 When "but for" causation has been
184. FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1995) (defining manslaughter in part as "[t]he killing of a
human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful
justification... and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or
murder...").
185. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 965-66.
186. Id. at 966.
187. Id. at 966-70.
188. Id. at 966. The Eversley court found that the concurring and dissenting opinions in
Bradley only contributed to this ambiguity. Id. Chief Justice Browne's concurrence was
described as only begging the question posed in the majority opinion, "[W']as the majority
holding that the State failed to prove causation in this case or that the State could never prove
causation in this case or any other case with similar facts?" Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 966 n.3.
189. Id. at 966.
190. Id. at 966-67.
191. Id. at 967. "But for" causation is also sometimes called "factual" or "actual"
causation. All three terms stand for the same concept.
192. Id.
193. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 966-67. This type of causation can also go by other names
such as "proximate cause." Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 967.
196. For example, assume baby Isaiah had a rare, untreatable disease that would have
killed him before or by the time he eventually died, then "but for" causation would not have been
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established, then legal causation becomes an issue.197 The Supreme Court of
Florida declared that two questions must be answered positively before this
type of causation exists. 19" The first question is "whether the prohibited
result of the defendant's conduct is beyond the scoNe of any fair assessment
of the danger created by the defendant's conduct. 99 The second question
is, "whether it would be otherwise unjust, based on fairness and policy
considerations, to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the
prohibited result." 20°
The court noted that the issue in Eversley involved "but for" causation
and not legal causation.2o1 That being so, the district court erred by using the
"substantial factor" or "material contributing factor" test.202 These types of
tests may be appropriate for the issue of legal causation but not for factual
causation. However, the supreme court in Eversley agreed with the
district court's conclusion that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove
causation here and rejected Chief Justice Browne's statements in Brad l
that "medical testimony cannot be the basis for establishing causation."
Advancements in medicine since Bradley were such that "it is common to
uphold convictions on the basis of medical testimony advancing reasonable
theories of causation when such testimony has been supplemented by other
proven. His mother may still have been culpably negligent for not getting him prompt
examination or treatment, but her negligence would not have been the factual cause of his death.
197. Id.
198. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
199. Id.
200. Id. Neither of these two questions can be answered with precision. Instead, in any
case where the fact finder must explicitly address the question of legal causation, the fact finder is
really being asked to make a policy decision that, given the circumstances of the case, criminal
responsibility should or should not be imposed on the accused. Only where the imposition of
criminal responsibility seems beyond the bounds of all fairness is an appellate court likely to
reverse a conviction for lack of legal causation.
As stated by one writer, '"he decision to attach causal responsibility for social harm to one
rather than to another actual cause is one made [by the fact finder] by use of common sense and
moral intuitions." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERMrANDiNG CRmINAL LAw 163 (1987). Dressier
clearly believes that unlike "but for" causation which can be reduced to answering precise, fact
based inquiries, legal causation is incapable of being found through using a formulaic process.
Instead, he suggests that courts can only consider a number of factors in making the intuitive
judgment they must make on legal causation. His discussion of both "but for" causation and legal
causation is among the best on these subjects and is highly recommended for readers desiring
more about these topics.
201. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 967.
202. Id. at 966.
203. See id. at 967.
204. Id.
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evidence supporting the causal relation at issue. 20 5 This medical testimony
"does not have to be expressed in terms of a reasonable medical certainty"
but instead could be stated as probabilities.2G6 Thus, the State's expert
testimony that there was a ninety-nine percent chance of survival had the
accused obtained prompt medical care for the child was sufficient to show
"but for" causation.2 7 The court recognized that Eversley had offered
contrary medical testimony but found that it was up to the jury to resolve the
differences between the two, as juries must with all questions of fact. 8
After rejecting both Bradley's and the district court's treatment of "but
for" causation, the Supreme Court of Florida turned its attention to the issue
of culpable negligence. 209 Here the Eversley court found that the Bradley
opinion resolved the issue.210 Eversley used the principle of legality to
resolve the question of whether the defendant could be convicted under the
manslaughter statute she was charged with violating.211 The court focused
on Justice Whitfield's language from the majority in Bradley that "the
general definition of 'manslaughter' contained in the statute does not
appear to cover a case of this nature.212 As the manslaughter statute in that
case was virtually the same as in Eversley, Bradley's reasoning was still
213
controlling. Thus, Eversley held "that under the statute in effect at the
time of the crime ... the failure to provide medical care does not satisfy the
culpable negligence element of manslaughter," so the mother's conviction
for this had to be overtumed.
214
The State fared better on the argument that Eversley had committed
215felony child abuse. The felony child abuse statute in effect when Isaiah
died specifically provided that "[w]hoever, willfully or by culpable
negligence, deprives a child of... necessary... medical treatment... and
in so doing causes great bodily harm" was guilty of a third-degree felony.
6
Unlike the manslaughter statute, "culpable negligence" for purposes of a
child abuse conviction had been interpreted several times to include
205. Id. at 968.
206. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 968 (quoting Delap v. State, 440 So. 2d 1242, 1253 (Fla.
1983)) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 967.
208. Id. at 968.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 968-70.
212. Id. at 968 (quoting Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677,679 (FIa. 1920)) (emphasis added).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 970.
216. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
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purposeful omissions which caused harm.2 17 The supreme court noted that
the trial court's reduction of Eversley's child abuse conviction rested on its
erroneous finding that there was insufficient evidence to believe she caused
the baby "great bodily harm." 218 As the only difference between felony and
misdemeanor child abuse was causing great bodily harm versus "the
infliction of physical or mental injury," 9 and the supreme court had found
the causation element met, it reinstated the Eversley jury's felony child
abuse verdict.220 Thus, the supreme court did not have to address the district
court's finding that the defendant's actions had amounted to willfulness
under the statute.
There is certainly an ironic bent to the supreme court's rulings in
Eversley. The mother was statutorily unable as a matter of law to commit
"culpable negligence" for purposes of a manslaughter charge but was not
only able, but explicitly found guilty of committing "culpable negligence"
for purposes of felony child abuse. 2 Unless one believes that the supreme
court intended "culpable negligence" to mean factually one thing for one
offense and something completely different for the other offense, there
initially seems to be an unresolvable conflict between the two rulings in the
same opinion. However, when the court's reasoning is examined closely, no
such inconsistency exists. Indeed, the Eversley holding is completely
consistent with basic notions of stare decisis, statutory construction, and
even constitutional law.
The bedrock for Eversley's different rulings on culpable negligence is
the principle of legality. Justice Whitfield in Bradley's majority had relied
on one aspect of this principle to find Bradley not guilty of manslaughter. 2
This aspect of the principle requires that before an act can be criminal, the
legislature must make it such by law.?2 Thus, Whitfield's opinion rested on
his statement that "[tbhere is no statute in this state specifically making the
failure or refusal of a father to provide medical attention for his child a
felony," and therefore Whitfield found that the general definition of
manslaughter did not extend to such inaction.224 Another aspect of the
principle of legality is that a legislature cannot judicially amend a statute to
make criminal, acts or omissions that were not previously considered to be
217. See, e.g., Nicholson v. State, 600 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 1992) (finding that "a
willful 'omission ... whereby unnecessary or unjustifiable pain or suffering is caused' constitutes
aggravated child abuse under section 827.03(Y).
218. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
219. FA. STAT. § 827.04(2) (1995).
220. Eversley, 748 So. 2d at 970.
221. See id.
222. Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677, 678 (Fla. 1920).
223. Id. at 678-79.
224. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
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prohibited by the statute. Thus, even though failure to provide a child
necessary medical aid had been made legislatively a felony when Isaiah died,
the legislature had not amended the general definition of manslaughter
beyond that in Bradley. As a result, the principles of legality and of stare
decisis forced the supreme court in Eversley to follow the Bradley holding,
whether the justices personally wanted to or not. If the court had not done
so, it would not only have violated the principle of legality and the concept
of stare decisis, but would also have possibly raised constitutional issues.
Judicial amendment of the manslaughter statute would have violated the due
process principle that people are entitled to fair notice of what constitutes a
crime. It would also have violated the prohibition against ex post facto
laws225 by retroactively making criminal what was previously not considered
criminal, that is, Eversley's failure to get care for her child. When examined
in light of these considerations, one certainly may not like the result that
Eversley could not be convicted of manslaughter but still must respect the
supreme court's ruling for sticking to higher principles of law.
Fortunately, Eversley's ruling on manslaughter has become an
aberration and should not occur again. As the court itself noted, shortly after
Isaiah's death, the Florida Legislature amended section 782.07 of the
Florida Statutes to add a third subsection explicitly stating that "[a] person
who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable
negligence under [section] 827.03(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of a
child," a first-degree felony."26 The 1996 Legislature also amended section
827.03 to include two new subsections explicitly defining what constitutes
"aggravated child abuse" 227 and "neglect of a child. ''"e Thus, "it is clear that
the Legislature now intends to include the failure to provide medical care
within the definition of manslaughter." 229 This legislative amendment also
225. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
226. Ch. 96-322, § 12, 1996 Fla. Laws 1761, 1774 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 782.07(3)
(2000)).
227. Id. § 8, 1996 Fla. Laws 1761, 1770 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 827.03(2)(a)-(c)
(2000)).
228. Id.
229. Eversley v. State, 748 So. 2d 963, 969 (Fla. 1999). The court also explicitly declared
that "[h]ad the amended statutes been in effect at the time of the alleged crime in this case,
Eversley's conduct would have been punishable as manslaughter." Id.
Eversley noted in its discussion that at least one previous Florida decision had concluded
that the failure to provide medical care when one would be considered to have a legal duty to do
so could not result in a manslaughter conviction. Id. at 965 (citing Neveils v. State, 145 So. 2d
883 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962)) (finding that a husband's failure to provide medical care for
his wife who died could not constitute manslaughter). Failure to provide necessary medical aid to
a child for whom one had assumed the duty of care had also been declared a proper basis for a
manslaughter conviction in other jurisdictions. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C.
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demonstrates an additional argument that Eversley was correct in
overturning the manslaughter conviction. Legislatures, when enacting or
amending statutes, are presumed to not engage in useless acts.m Thus, if the
previous definition of manslaughter had been meant to include those acts or
omissions included in the new amendments, these would have been mere
redundancies. Since statutes should not be construed in a way that makes
them totally or even partially redundant, the previous manslaughter statute
could not have included culpable negligence through failure to furnish
needed medical care to a child.
VI. SELF-DEFENSE, DUTY TO RETREAT, AND THE "CASTLE DOCTRINE"
Florida statutory law recognizes that one may use force to defend
oneself from an attack 231 This use of force may even extend to the use of
deadly force when one "reasonably believes that such [deadly] force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself. ' z 2
However, the person threatened cannot use deadly force without first doing
everything possible to avoid doing so, including retreating, even though the
other person is the wrongful aggressor.233 Common law has recognized one
exception to this duty to retreat whenever possible, known as the "castle
doctrine.' 2"2 Under this doctrine, Florida courts have recognized that
persons attacked at home do not have to retreat or try to retreat from their
home before using deadly force in self-defense, so long as the deadly force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.235 Unfortunately, Florida
case law has also crafted exceptions to this exception, leaving the state of the
law in this area confusing and irrational . 6
Cir. 1962). Thus, the Florida Legislature's amendment of section 782.07 is not surprising; what
is surprising is how long it took for this to be done after Bradey.
230. Beachv. GreatW. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 152 (Fla. 1997).
231. FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2000).
232. Id. The remainder of this section justifies deadly force if one reasonably believes it
necessary to prevent the same bodily harm to "another or to prevent the imminent commission of
a forcible felony." Id.
Use of deadly force to defend another or prevent the commission of a forcible felony is
beyond the scope of this article's discussion. For the statutory definition of what constitutes a
"forcible felony," see § 776.08.
233. See State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 725 (Fla. 1982) (quoting the trial court's
jury instructions on the legal duty to retreat).
234. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1049-51.
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In Weiand v. State,'3' the Supreme Court of Florida recently eliminated
these irrational exceptions and helped bring clarity to the "castle doctrine's"
application. In Weiand, the defendant was charged with the first-degree
murder of her husband.238  During a violent argument, Weiand shot her
husband in the apartment where they lived with their newborn child.239 She
claimed the killing was in self-defense and presented exert testimony about
battered woman's syndrome to support her argument. Weiand herself
claimed her husband had choked, beaten, and threatened her with more
violence if she ever tried to leave him.2 1 Two experts testified that she
suffered from battered woman's syndrome.2 2 One of these experts, based
on her examination of Weiand and the expert's own studies, concluded that
"when Weiand shot her husband she believed that he was going to seriously
hurt or kill her.''243 This expert also explained that Weiand did not leave her
home during the fatal argument for several reasons despite her apparent
opportunities to do so." The defense requested that the trial court give the
standard jury instruction on the "castle doctrine. '" 5 However, the court
refused and instead gave the instruction regarding the general duty to retreat
in a case of self-defense.246 The jurors were told that "[t]he fact that the
defendant was wrongfully attacked cannot justify her use of force likely to
cause death or great bodily harm if by retreating she could have avoided the
237. 732 So. 2d 1044, 1044 (Fla. 1999).
238. Id. at 1048.
239. Id.
240. Id. In Hickson, the court held that expert testimony about the battered spouse
syndrome should be admissible to support a self-defense claim, provided that the expert witness
is properly qualified to testify on this subject. State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1993).
The syndrome itself is not a defense but only a way of explaining to the fact finder why a battered
spouse would have acted the way the spouse did in certain circumstances.
241. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. The expert believed that Weiand did not flee, because she felt unable to do so as
she had recently given birth, she was paralyzed with fear, she had been choked unconscious
(although when this occurred in relation to the killing is not clear), and past experience had
shown her that threatening to leave only increased her husband's violence. Id.
245. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1048. This instruction would have told the jurors that:
If the defendant was attacked in [his][her] own home or on [his][her] own
premises, [he][she] had no duty to retreat and had the lawful right to stand
[his][her] ground and meet force with force, even to the extent of using force
likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent either
death or great bodily harm.
Id.
246. Id.
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need to use that force. '' 47 In the prosecutor's closing argument, the State
stressed that in order for her actions to be considered justifiable self-defense,
Weiand must have used all _possible means to avoid the killing, including
leaving the couple's home. Weiand was convicted of second-degree
murder and sentenced to eighteen years in prison.2 9 The Second District
Court of Appeal initially affirmed Weiand's conviction.m On rehearing, the
appellate court certified the question of the jury instruction concerning the
duty of retreat to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public
importance.51 The supreme court accepted and rephrased the certified
question to address the correctness of the jury instructions on retreat and
self-defense in a case like this.
z2
According to the supreme court, the trial court's instruction was
technically correct as the instruction followed the supreme court's opinion in
State v. Bobbitt.253 Prior to Bobbitt, the supreme court held that a lawful
resident had the privilege of nonretreat from her home when the resident was
attacked by her lover who was lawfully in the home as an invitee at the time
of the killing.z 4 Bobbitt examined whether the privilege should apply when
the person killed is not only lawfully present but is also a co-occupant of the
home. 25 Bobbitt and her husband were living together when she killed him
during his unprovoked attack on her.Y The Bobbitt trial court failed to
instruct the jury that as the attack was unlawful and happened in her home,
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Wejand, 732 So. 2d at 1049.
250. Weiand v. State, 701 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997). This opinion
concerned issues not pertinent to the "castle doctrine" and the duty to retreat.
251. The original question certified by the Second District was:
SHOULD THE RULE OF STATE V. BOBBITT, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982),
BE CHANGED TO ALLOW THE CASTLE DOCTRINE INSTRUCTION IN
CASES WHERE THE DEFENDANT RELIES ON BATTERED-SPOUSE
SYNDROME EVIDENCE (AS NOW AUTHORIZED BY STATE V.
HICKSON, 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1994D] TO SUPPORT A CLAIM OF SELF-
DEFENSE AGAINST AN AGGRESSOR WHO WAS A COHABITANT OF
THE RESIDENCE WHERE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED?
We n 732 So. 2d at 1046-47.
252. Id. at 1047.
253. 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), recededfrom by Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla.
1999).
254. Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824, 827 (Fla. 1965). The court rejected the argument
that the "castle doctrine" only applied when the person killed was a trespasser as was the case in
Pell v. State. Id. (discussing Pell v. State, 122 So. 110 (Fla. 1929)).
255. Bobbit, 415 So. 2d at 724.
256. Id. at 725.
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the defendant had no duty to retreat to the maximum extent possible.
Instead, the jury was instructed about the defendant's general duty to retreat
when attacked before a killing could be considered self-defense.2 8 The
supreme court approved this instruction and also Aproved the failure to
further instruct the jurors on the "castle doctrine." The court noted its
earlier decision finding that the doctrine applied when one is attacked at
home by an invitee who is lawfully present but not living in the home as
well.260 However, the court felt the Bobbitt situation was distinguishable. 261
Thus, the Bobbitt court held that:
[T]he privilege not to retreat, premised on the maxim that every
man's home is his castle which he is entitled to protect from
invasion, does not apply here where both Bobbitt and her husband
had equal rights to be in the "castle" and neither had the legal right
to eject the other.262
Implicit in this decision was the distinction between trespassers,
invitees, and co-occupants. Trespassers have no legal right to be in an
occupant's home while invitees do, by virtue of the lawful occupant's
invitation. However, the supreme court evidently considered this invitation
implicitly revoked because of the invitee's unprovoked attack, thus reducing
the invitee's status to that of a trespasser. The same could not be said of co-
occupants who had equal legal rights to be on the premises when the attack
began. Ironically, one result of Bobbitt was that it functionally changed this
equality of the right to remain. The attacker was considered legally on the
premises, but the attacked victim's right to remain was reduced by the
257. Id. The trial court declined to give the requested jury instruction which was:
One unlawfully attacked in his own home or on his own premises has no duty
to retreat and may lawfully stand his ground and meet force with force,
including deadly force, if necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily
harm to himself or another, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
Id.
258. Id.
259. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d at 726.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. In so doing, the court approved language from Conner that a mother attacked in
her home by a son living there also had the general duty to retreat and could not claim the benefit
of the "castle doctrine." Id. at 726 (reviewing Connor v. State, 361 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1978)). The Conner court claimed this did not make the mother defenseless as she could
still use deadly force if retreating from the home would increase her chances of death or great
bodily harm. Connor v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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victim's obligation to retreat fully if, by doing so, the victim could avoid
using deadly force without endangering the victim.
Justice Overton dissented from the majority's opinion in Bobbitt. 3 His
dissent criticized the artificial distinctions made based solely upon the status
of the attacker.? One result of Bobbitt that he correctly pointed out was
that it "places the wife in the same position as if the altercation had occurred
in a public place." 20 He criticized the different applications of the duty to
retreat between an attack by one family member on another member when
both live in the home and when only one member lives in the home.
266
Justice Overton claimed that "the majority's rule is in fact a minority
position which does not recognize the realities of life."267 Instead of the
State or defense's positions, Justice Overton argued for the establishment of
a limited duty to retreat rule when the victim is attacked by one legally in the
home regardless of the attacker's status.2" This rule would place upon the
victim attacked a duty to retreat within the home, if possible, but not require
the victim to actually leave the home.. 9 Victims could meet force with
equal force, even deadly force, if such force were needed to prevent their
death or great bodily harm.270
In Weiand, the supreme court receded from its position in Bobbitt and
adopted Justice Overton's suggestion to adopt a limited duty to retreat when
both the person attacked and the attacker are lawfully in the home.27 1 The
court did so for two reasons. First, Bobbitt was found to rely on
considerations of "property law and possessory rights" that are inconsistent
with the "castle doctrine. That doctrine is grounded, not in a notion of
263. Bobbin, 415 So. 2d at 726 (Overton, ., dissenting).
264. Id. at 729.
265. d. at 727.
266. Id. at 728.
267. Id
268. Bobbin, 415 So. 2d at 728. This limited rule would apply "when the assailant in
one's home is an invitee, a cotenant, or a family member." Id. Thus, by implication it would not
change the "castle doctrine" when the attacker is a trespasser.
269. See id.
270. Id. Justice Overton proposed the following instruction on this limited duty:
If the defendant was attacked in [his/her] own home, or on [his/her] own
premises, by a cotenant, family member, or invitee, [he/she] has a duty to
retreat to the extent reasonably possible but is not required to flee [his/her]
home and has the lawful right to stand [his/her] ground and meet force with
force even to the extent of using force likely to cause death or great bodily
harm if it was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to
[himself/herself] or another.
Id.
271. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999).
272. ki
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superior property rights of one against another, but in the realistic, "time-
honored principle that the home is the ultimate sanctuary. ' '273  Second,
increased awareness and understanding of domestic violence showed that
there were sound policy reasons to recede from Bobbitt.274 The court noted
that studies showed that "[d]omestic violence is the single major cause of
injury to women. ' 275  Other studies showed that attempted retreat by a
battered spouse can actually increase the chances of the spouse being killed
or seriously harmed, as the retreat often served to further provoke the
attacker. 276 The court also believed that an instruction requiring the battered
spouse to leave the home (as opposed to retreating in it, if possible)
perpetuated the "common myth that the victims of domestic violence are free
to leave the battering relationship any time they wish to do so.
'277
Weiand recognized the argument that eliminating a duty to retreat from
the home when the parties involved are co-occupants could ultimately
increase the number of violent encounters, as more violence in the home is
likely to occur between co-occcupants than between occupants and
trespassers or invitees.278 However, the court found that this argument was
not supported by any empirical studies.279 Instead, the court determined that
forcing complete retreat, when possible, could actually increase the number
of domestic violence incidents. Furthermore, the court noted that even
when an attacked co-occupant does not have to completely retreat from the
home, that occupant is not absolutely privileged to use deadly force.2 1 The
general rule that defensive force must be proportionate to the offensive force
still exists under the limited duty rule.u Thus, attacked occupants cannot
kill unless they reasonably use all means to avoid doing so. The limited duty
to retreat rule merely recognizes that one of the means the law of self-
defense cannot reasonably expect people to use is to leave their homes when
attacked. Weiand thus approved of Justice Overton's suggested jury
instruction, with some minor changes in language.
283
273. Id. at 1052.
274. Id. at 1051.
275. Id. at 1053.
276. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1054.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1056.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1056.
282. See id.
283. Id. The exact instruction approved in Weiand is as follows:
If the defendant was attacked in [his/her] own home, or on [his/her] own
premises, by a co-occupant [or any other person lawfully on the premises]
[he/she] had a duty to retreat to the extent reasonably possible without
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Weiand brings Florida in line with the majority of courts that have
considered this question.2 Moreover, it eliminates irrational outcomes
based on minor distinctions in how an attacker is lawfully in the home.
While the court's decision spends much time discussing domestic violence
against women, its rule is equally applicable when the husband/male lover is
the one attacked.20 Additionally, at least one commentator has argued that
even though Florida recognized the battered spouse syndrome as part of the
law of self-defense "as a matter of law, self-defense was still nearly
impossible for a battered spouse to prove because of the [Bobbitt] duty to
retreat." m After Weiand, this should certainly be a different case.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A. Separation of Powers
During the past year, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed a problem
that has drawn frequent public attention and criticism: the efficiency and
fairness of Florida's death penalty appellate process. During a special
legislative session, the Florida Legislature attempted to expedite the process
through the Death Penalty Reform Act of 2000 ("DPRA").' 7 The DRPA
attempted to significantly alter the state's post conviction process in capital
cases with several specific revisions, particularly with its creation of a "dual-
track" process in which post conviction claims could be filed almost
contemporaneously with a direct appeal.28
While expressing sympathy with the legislature's desire to improve the
efficiency and speed of the process, the Supreme Court of Florida asserted
its prerogative under the Florida Constitution to exclusively control the
power to adopt judicial rules of practice and procedure in Allen v.
increasing [his/her] own danger of death or great bodily harm. However, the
defendant was not required to flee [his/her] home and had the lawful right to
stand [his/her] ground and meet force with force even to the extent of using
force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if it was necessary to prevent
death or great bodily harm to [himself/herself].
Id. at 1057.
284. Id. at 1051.
285. The rule would presumably also be applicable in same-sex domestic relationships.
286. Douglas A. Orr, Weiand v. State and Battered Spouse Syndrome: The Toothless
Tigress Can Now Roar, 74 FLA. B.L 14, 16 (2000). This article provides a good, concise
discussion of the battered spouse syndrome and the duty to retreat in Florida before and after
Weland.
287. Ch. 2000-3, §§ 1-22,2000 Fla. Laws 4,4-23.
288. Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52,55 (Fla. 2000).
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Butterworth,289 where it found that most sections of the DPRA violated the
provisions of the Florida Constitution that guarantee separation of powers of
the branches of state government.290 Using its mandamus authority,291 the
court held that the statute interfered with its power to "adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts," including the time for seeking appellate
review.2g The court rejected the State's contention that the law's deadlines
for filing post conviction motions were statutes of limitations that would
293have fallen within the legislature's substantive lawmaking powers. While
recognizing that habeas corpus petitions are technically civil in nature, the
court declared that they were actually quasi-criminal because they are heard
and disposed of in criminal courts. 9,C The fact that the writ of habeas corpus
is explicitly provided for in the text of the Florida Constitution2o was also
deemed significant by the court.296 The court also distinguished an Eleventh
Circuit decision that permitted Congress to impose a deadline on filing
habeas corpus actions in federal courts.297 The court noted that unlike the
federal Constitution, which provides that the United States Supreme Court
.298derives its appellate jurisdiction from congressional authority, the
authority for original and appellate jurisdiction in Florida courts is entirely
derived from Article V of the Florida Constitution. 299 Despite the DPRA's
severability provision, the court also found most of the sections so
"inextricably intertwined" as to preclude severance.
300
Nevertheless, the court's shared concern for efficiency prompted it to
propose amendments to Rules 3.851 and 3.852 of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure.30 1 The court noted that the amendments were meant to
balance the need to carry out a sentence of death "in a manner that is fair,
just, and humane and that conforms to constitutional requirements" with the
289. 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000).
290. Id. at 52; see FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3. The court did not strike sections 11, 14, 15,
and 16 of the DPRA. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65. Although the court also found that some
provisions violated equal protection and due process doctrines, its holding was based on its
separation of powers analysis. Id. at 58.
291. Id. at 54 (relying on FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8)).
292. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a)).
293. Id. at 62.
294. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 61.
295. FIA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
296. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 61.
297. Weekley v. Moore, 204 F.3d 1083 (1lth Cir. 2000).
298. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
299. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 63.
300. Id. at 65.
301. Id.; see also Amendments to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, 3.852, 3.993, 25 Fla. L Weekly
S285 (Fla. Apr. 14,2000).
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need for promptness and efficiency in administering justice.3 °2 Arguably,
the timing of these amendments may also reflect an attempt by the court to
circumvent more attempts by the state legislature to interfere with the court's
powers.
The court also informed the legislature in its opinion that Florida's
public records laws 30 3 had to be amended in order for the dual-track system
to work. 3° Because Florida statutes currently exempt criminal intelligence
and investigation information from disclosure during appeals, defendants
could not pursue all potential remedies until such exemptions end. The court
noted that the dual-track system could not work until these exemptions are
removed by the legislature.
Finally, in this clash between the judicial and legislative branches, the
court also seized the opportunity to plead for more funding. 6  In its
conclusion the court noted that a reliable justice system requires funding at
all levels.36 The court argued that funding was needed for the attorneys
litigating death penalty cases as well as for the courts.30 8 This case probably
correctly reflects the appropriate roles for the legislative and judicial
branches to undertake in this politically sensitive area. With new public
attention focused on cases in other states where wrongly accused defendants
have proven their innocence through DNA evidence, the need to proceed
cautiously in reviewing cases where the death penalty has been imposed
seems even more critical. In addition, the court's decision underlines the
importance of maintaining an independent judiciary that retains control over
its practice and procedures. In an area where the state decides to end
someone's life, it is arguably important that the process be deliberate and
cautious. Nevertheless, if the court's proposed procedural reforms do not
actually reduce delays in the process, one can expect further attempts from
the other two branches to continue to change the process. This case seems to
indicate, however, that the court will be diligent in protecting its authority
from encroachment by the other branches.
B. Due Process
The Supreme Court of Florida also had the opportunity to consider due
process challenges to a pair of criminal statutes during the past year. In State
302. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65.
303. FLA. STAT. § 119 (1999).
304. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 65.
305. Id. at 65-66 (discussing FL4. STAT. § 119.07(3)(b), (3)(1), .011(3)(d)(2) (2000)).
306. Id. at 67.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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v. O.C.,309 a juvenile defendant challenged the constitutionality of section
874.04 of the Florida Statutes, a provision that enhanced criminal penalties
for members of criminal street gangs. O.C., a juvenile was found guilty
of attempted aggravated battery and misdemeanor battery.31l The State then
moved for a penalty enhancement pursuant to the aforementioned statutory
section. 312 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the
law was unconstitutional because it enhanced punishment for "mere
association. '31 3 The problematic language of the challenged section
permitted enhancement for belonging to a criminal street gang. 314  The
Supreme Court of Florida first noted that both the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Florida
Constitution provide that citizens have the right to be protected from
deprivations of their legally protected interests without due process of law.315
The clauses permit legitimate interference with one's legal rights, but only if
the means chosen "shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the
object sought to be attained and shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. '' 316  The court reviewed previous decisions 317 that overturned
statutes criminalizing otherwise innocent activities without a showing of
criminal intent or behavior.318 Because this statute made simple association
with others who may not even be criminals a ground for penalty
enhancement, without also requiring a showing that there was a nexus
between the criminal act committed by the defendant and his membership in
the organization, it seems that the court was correct. To permit a penalty
enhancement for merely belonging to an organization, the definition of
which is relatively broad in the statute, raises a number of constitutional
309. 748 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 1999).
310. Id. at 945.
311. Id. at 946.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 947.
314. Section 874.04 of the Florida Statutes states as follows:
Upon a finding by the court at sentencing that the defendant is a member of a
criminal street gang, the penalty for any felony or misdemeanor, or any
delinquent act or violation of law which would be a felony or misdemeanor if
committed by an adult, may be enhanced if the offender was a member of a
criminal street gang at the time of the commission of such offense.
FLA. STAT. § 874.04 (2000).
315. O.C., 748So. 2dat948.
316. Id. (emphasis omitted).
317. Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993); State v. Walker, 461 So. 2d 108 (Fla.
1984).
318. O.C., 748So. 2dat949.
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questions. 319 The court distinguished a decision by the Supreme Court of
California2  that rejected a challenge to a criminal gang statute permitting
enhancement where the defendant committed the crime, "for the benefit of,
at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members." 32  This decision seems correct in striking a statute that was too
broad in its sweep at addressing a perceived societal harm.
The court also considered a due process challeng to the criminal
statute that punishes neglect of the elderly and disabled in Sieniarecki v.
State.323 Patricia Sieniarecki lived in an apartment with her boyfriend and
mother.324 Although in her fifties, the elder Sieniarecki became despondent
and disoriented after the combination of her husband's death and a surgery
on her hip.32 Mrs. Sieniarecki was found dead on a mattress soiled with
319. Section 874.03(2)(a)-(h) of the Florida Statutes lists eight criteria for classifying a
person as being a member of a "Criminal Street Gang" as follows:
(2) "Criminal street gang member" is a person who is a member of a criminal
street gang as defined in subsection (1) and who meets two or more of the
following criteria:
(a) Admits to criminal street gang membership.
(b) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by a parent or guardian.
(c) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by a documented reliable
informant.
(d) Resides in or frequents a particular criminal street gang's area and adopts
their style of dress, their use of hand signs, or their tattoos, and associates with
known criminal street gang members.
(e) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by an informant of
previously untested reliability and such identification is corroborated by
independent information.
(f) Has been arrested more than once in the company of identified criminal
street gang members for offenses which are consistent with usual criminal
street gang activity.
(g) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by physical evidence such as
photographs or other documentation.
(h) Has been stopped in the company of known criminal street gang members
four or more times.
§ 874.03(2)(a)-(h).
320. People v. Gardeley, 927 P.2d 713 (Cal. 1996).
321. O.C., 748 So. 2d at 950 (quoting Gardeley, 927 P.2d at 720). The court did not
reach the First Amendment challenge to the statute. Id.
322. FLA. STAT. § 825.102(3) (1997).
323. 756 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2000).
324. Id. at 70.
325. Id.
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urine and feces wearing only a polo shirt and one tennis shoe.32  She
weighed only sixty-eight pounds. 27 The cause of death was septicemia
caused by decubitus ulcers as well as bladder and vaginal infections.
3
Dehydration and malnutrition also contributed to the cause of death.329
Found guilty of neglect, the defendant argued on appeal that the statute
violated her due process rights by imposing an affirmative duty upon her
while penalizing a failure to comply, and that the statute was
unconstitutionally vague and interfered with her mother's right to privacy.
330
The due process challenge included an argument that the statute failed
to contain a specific intent requirement.33 1 The court compared this
challenge to similar ones previously decided by the court in regard to the
state's child protection statutes.332  Although the court had struck child
neglect statutes that penalized persons for mere negligence, it had also
upheld a statutory provision in the child neglect area that required
willfulness or culpable negligence.333 Similarly, because section 825.102(3)
of the Florida Statutes also requires willfulness or culpable neligence by
the caregiver, it was therefore found to pass constitutional muster.
In response to the vagueness challenge, the court noted that the test for
vagueness in Florida is "whether the statute gives a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. 335 The court
held that pursuant to the facts of this case, the victim was sufficiently
336impaired to be considered disabled under the statute. It also felt that the
326. Id. at 71.
327. Id. at 70.
328. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 71.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 72.
331. Id. at 73.
332. Id. at 73-74 (citing State v. Mincey, 672 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1996) and invalidating
FLA. STAT. § 827.05 (1991) because the amended statute continued to criminalize simple
negligence); State v. Winters, 346 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1977) (overturning FLA. STAT. § 827.05
(1975) for vagueness and overbreadth). For a discussion of the Mincey decision, see Dobson,
supra note 5, at 127-31.
333. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 74 (citing State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1978)).
334. Id.
335. Id. (citing Brown v. State, 629 So. 2d 841,842-43 (Fla. 1994)).
336. Id. at 75. Section 825.101(4) of the Florida Statutes defines "Disabled Adult" as:
[A] person 18 years of age or older who suffers from a condition of physical
or mental incapacitation due to a developmental disability, organic brain
damage, or mental illness, or who has one or more physical or mental
limitations that restrict the person's ability to perform the normal activities of
daily living.
FLA. STAT. § 825.101(4) (2000).
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facts were sufficient so that the defendant had adequate notice of the fact
that she could be deemed a caregiver as defined by the statute.
3 3 7
The court also found that the defendant lacked standing to raise a facial
vagueness challenge or the victim's alleged privacy rights.3 8 This decision
clearly seems consistent with the court's prior decisions on the child neglect
statute.339 In addition, the facts of this case did make it very difficult for this
defendant to plausibly argue that she did not understand that her mother's
physical and mental state fit within the definition of disabilitym or that the
defendant's conduct satisfied the definition of caregiver.34 1 In addition, the
state of the victim indicated that the care provided fell below that of mere
inattentiveness. 34  It is not difficult to find a culpable state of mind by the
defendant in this case. Whether the statute is sufficiently clear could be
tested in other cases where the neglect is less egregious. Arguably, the
heightened mens rea imposed by the court may save the statute in those
cases as well.
C. Federalism
The Supreme Court of Florida also rejected a variety of federalism
challenges to criminal charges brought against a defendant for acts that
occurred on a cruise ship in waters beyond the state's territorial boundaries
in State v. Stepansky.343 Matthew Stepansky was charged in Brevard County
with burglary and attempted sexual battery of a thirteen-year-old on a cruise
ship.3 " Although both the victim and defendant were United States citizens,
337. Sierniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 75.
338. Id. at 76.
339. Some other states have even upheld constitutional attacks against statutes that
provided criminal penalties for "mere" negligence. Dobson, supra note 5, at n.141.
340. Sierniarecki, 756 So. 2d at 70-71. The evidence indicated that the victim would not
walk, required adult diapers, and generally refused to eat. Id. In addition, the defendant's
boyfriend told the apartment manager, who inquired about the victim's ability to reach the
upstairs apartment into which the family was moving, that the victim "would not ever be coming
back down the stairs anymore." Id. at 70. The boyfriend carried the victim into the apartment
when the family moved in. Id. at 70-71.
341. Id. at 70. The evidence indicated that when the children of the victim discussed with
which child the mother would live, the family agreed she would live with the defendant because
she did not work and would be able to take care of her mother unlike her two brothers who
worked long hours and would not have as much time to spend with her. Sieniarecki, 756 So. 2d
at 70.
342. Id. at 75.
343. 761 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000).
344. Id. at 1029.
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neither was a Florida resident at the time of the alleged attack.345 No other
jurisdiction had attempted to prosecute the crime. The special maritime
criminal jurisdiction statute that was challenged in this case extended the
state's jurisdiction to acts committed on ships outside the state's territorial
waters, if the "act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of
the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to
finally disembark" in Florida.347 Stepansky moved to dismiss the action on
the basis that Florida lacked jurisdiction.3 Upon denial of the motion, he
sought a writ of prohibition from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which
issued the writ.
34W
A number of issues were raised by this case. First, the state's
jurisdiction over criminal acts generally extends to those committed wholly
or partly within its geogrgahical boundaries. Florida's boundary extends
three miles from its coast.35 From an international law perspective, a vessel
on the high seas is generally regarded as part of the territory of the nation of
its owners. 351 In this case, the alleged acts occurred 100 nautical miles from
the Atlantic coastline of Florida. The ship was registered in Liberia and
belonged to a cruise line from the British West Indies. 3  In addition,
although the states are generally responsible for defining and prosecuting
crimes, they are precluded in some circumstances from asserting authority
where the federal government has primary authority and has preempted that
area of law.354 The Supreme Court of Florida first considered Article I,
section 8, clause 10 of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress
the right to define piracies and felonies on the high seas. The court held
that this provision did not preclude the state from criminalizing the same
act.
356
Next, the court considered whether the prosecution violated the "flag
state rule" of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and therefore
interfered with the national government's treaty powers. 7 The "flag state
rule" states that a ship shall sail under the flag of one state and that state
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1030.
347. F.A. STAT. § 910.006(3)(d) (1995).
348. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1030.
349. Id.
350. FLA. CONST. art. H, § 1(a).
351. 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw § 491 (1998).
352. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1029.
353. Id. at 1030.
354. Id. at 1030-31.
355. Id. at 1031.
356. Id.
357. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1032.
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shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the ship8 absent exceptional cases
expressly provided for in international treaties.35 The defendant conceded
that he "lack[ed] standing to raise a violation of an international treaty that is
not self-executing." 359 The court held that the treaty was not self-executing
and did not limit the jurisdiction asserted by the United States over foreign
vessels.36
The defendant also conceded that the United States could prosecute him
for his conduct. 61 In 1994, the federal government, by statute, did assert
maritime jurisdiction over offenses committed on the high seas by or against
United States nationals on board foreign vessels scheduled to depart from or
arrive in the United States."2 The court held that this federal statute did not
preclude the state from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the activity.363
Having held that the statute did not interfere with the aforementioned
provisions of the United States Constitution or federal statutes, the court
next considered whether the State could exercise jurisdiction over an act
committed outside its territory. 64 The court cited the "effects" doctrine that
permits jurisdiction over acts "intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects" within the state. 6  The court accepted the State's
argument that its tourism industry would suffer a significant adverse effect if
it could not prosecute crimes on cruise ships where neither the federal or
366foreign governments prosecute. Justice Wells filed a dissenting opinion
arguing that the legislature lacked authority to extend jurisdiction conducted
outside the territorial boundaries of the state over the acts of nonresidents.
367
He argued that jurisdiction over this act could only be roperly asserted by
the United States or other relevant foreign governments.
Arguably the dissent and the Fifth District Court of Appeal have more
correctly analyzed the issues in this case. Even if the 1994 legislation did
not preempt the field of maritime law, it does not therefore follow that the
State of Florida retains the authority to extend its criminal jurisdiction over
acts occurring in a location that a valid treaty entered into by the national
358. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. VI, 13 U.S.T. 2313,2315,
450 U.N.T.S. 82, 86.
359. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1032.
360. Id. at 1037.
361. Id. at 1033.
362. 18 U.S.C. § 7(8) (1994).
363. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1033-34.
364. Id. at 1035.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1036.
367. Id. at 1037 (Wells, J., dissenting).
368. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d at 1037.
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government has deemed to be under the jurisdiction of a foreign
government. As stated by the district court of appeal:
Although there is authority for the United States to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction over its nationals, there simply is no
basis for such an extension by a political subdivision of the United
States in regard to the territory of a foreign country-and the
flagship of another country is just that. The State of Florida is
constitutionally prohibited from entering into a treat with Liberia
in respect to jurisdiction of crimes on the high seas.36
The Supreme Court of Florida's broad interpretation of its "effects"
doctrine causes one to ponder how far it would be willing to extend its
jurisdiction to acts occurring outside of its boundaries. As noted by the
concurring opinion of Judge Harris of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the
statute would seemingly permit the State to prosecute a person who commits
a criminal act against another even if both persons are nationals of the ship's
flag State and have physically entered Florida soil so long as the ship
stopped at a Florida port and picked up over half of its revenue passengers
there with an intent to return them to Florida.37° Contrary to the conclusions
of the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida, this statutory
scheme does not appear to be narrowly drawn or consistent with the federal
Constitution, which specifically grants the power to make treaties to the
President and the Senate.371 In addition, the Constitution makes proerly
executed treaties the supreme law of the land, binding upon the states. The
power of the national government in this area has been considered to be so
unquestioned as to raise debate about whether a treaty was even subject to
constitutional limitations.373 The United States Supreme Court has rejected
attempts by the states to impose Tenth Amendment limits upon the national
government's treaty power.374 This assertion of jurisdiction by Florida
seems to contravene the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and therefore
constitutional limitations as well.
369. Stepansky v. State, 707 So. 2d 877, 879 (Fla. 5th Dist. CL App. 1995), rev'd, 761
So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000).
370. Id. at 880.
371. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
372. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
373. See discussion in NowAK& RorTuNDA, CONSTTumoNALLAW §6.6 (5thed. 1995).
374. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483
(1879).
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